A Reappraisal of General and Limited Jurisdiction in California by Kallay, Thomas
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 1
12-15-1980
A Reappraisal of General and Limited Jurisdiction
in California
Thomas Kallay
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Corporation and Enterprise
Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal
History, Theory and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Kallay A Reappraisal of General and Limited Jurisdiction in California , 8 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1981)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/1
A Reappraisal of General and Limited
Jurisdiction in California
THOMAS KALLAY*
The ability of a California court to assert jurisdiction over business enter-
prises currently depends upon how the court characterizes the nature and
extent of the business's activities within the state. If the in-state business
activities of a particular concern are extensive, California courts will ex-
ercise all-encompassing general jurisdiction over the cause of action, but if
the activities are insufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion, which has been invariably the case, the court will then turn to a con-
sideration of limited jurisdiction, which jurisdiction depends upon the
quality and nature of the business's activities in the forum in relation to
the particular cause of action at issue. The author suggests that general-
limited jurisdiction is neither a sound theory nor a useful analytical tool.
The article notes the historical origins of this two-fold approach, compares
it with the current decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing
with a state's ability to gain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state busi-
nesses, and suggests viable alternatives to the current California jurisdic-
tional approach. Professor Kallay ultimately concludes that the main
focus in jurisdictional questions should not be decided by this two-tier
analysis but instead should follow the requirements set down by this na-
tion's Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner: jurisdiction must be evaluated
solely by the relationships between the litigation, the forum and the de-
fendant.
INTRODUCTION
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Cornelison v.
* A.B., J.D. University of California, Los Angeles. Professor of Law, South-
western University School of Law.
Chaney' presented the bench and bar of the state with a gift of
dubious value: a theory that state court jurisdiction 2 is either
general 3 or limited in nature.
Cornelison attempted to delineate the differences between gen-
eral and limited jurisdiction. 4 The court concluded that general
1. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
2. Jurisdiction throughout this article is intended to refer to personal and not
subject matter jurisdiction.
3. It is not the state supreme court but rather the California courts of appeal
which have apparently concluded that Cornelison announced a general theory of
state court jurisdiction. In Sibley v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976) a case decided shortly after Cornelison, the supreme court
gave Cornelison only passing mention even though the facts of Sibley warranted
the application of the doctrines defined in Cornelison. See note 120 infra and text
accompanying note 121 infra. General and limited jurisdiction have not been men-
tioned by the California Supreme Court since Cornelison in any of its decisions
relating to state court jurisdiction, Sibley and Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, (1977) rev'd 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Kulko was also
a decision where the facts permitted the court to apply general and limited juris-
diction. See note 200 infra and text accompanying note 121 infra. Nonetheless,
Cornelison is not even cited by the California Supreme Court in Kulko. Notwith-
standing the state supreme court's lack of enthusiasm for Cornelison and the doc-
trines there announced, thirteen appellate opinions have decided cases in terms of
Cornelison's general jurisdiction approach. See notes 33 and 34 infra.
Some federal courts applying California law have followed Cornelison; Kip-
perman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems
Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, (9th Cir. 1977); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779
n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, (9th Cir. 1977).
4. If a nonresident defendant's activities may be described as 'extensive
or wideranging' (Buckeye Boiler v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 893,
898-899 [80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57] or 'substantial . . . continuous and
systematic' (Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co., supra, 342 U.S. 437, 447-449 [96
L.Ed. 485, 493-494]), there is a constitutionally sufficient relationship to
warrant jurisdiction for all causes of action asserted against him. In such
circumstances, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged
be connected with the defendant's business relationship to the forum.
If, however, the defendant's activities in the forum are not so pervasive
as to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over him, then jurisdiction
depends upon the quality and nature of his activity in the forum in rela-
tion to the particular cause of action. In such a situation, the cause of ac-
tion must arise out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum, or defendant must perform some other act by which he purpose-
fully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby involving the benefits and protections of its laws. Thus, as the re-
lationship of the defendant with the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction
over him grows more tenuous, the scope of jurisdiction also retracts, and
fairness is assured by limiting the circumstances under which the plaintiff
can compel him to appear and defend. The crucial inquiry concerns the
character of defendant's activity in the forum, whether the cause of action
arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity, and upon
the balancing of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the
state in assuming jurisdiction. (Hanson v. Denckla, supra 357 U.S. 235,
250-253 [2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1295-1298]; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
supra, 355 U.S. 220, 223 [2 L.Ed. 2d 223, 2261; Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898-899; see 14 West's Annot. Code Civ. Proc.
(1973 ed.) 410.10, p. 459 [Deerings's, Code Civ. Proc. 410.10 p. 6671, for the
Judicial Council's extensive comment on the bases of jurisdiction.)
16 Cal. 3d at 147-48, 545 P.2d at 266-67, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
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jurisdiction might be asserted when there are extensive or wide-
ranging business activities in California.5 A California state court
would then have jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action
whether or not they are "connected with the defendant's business
relationship to the forum."6 If a court is not exercising general ju-
risdiction, it is asserting limited jurisdiction over the defendant.7
In such an instance, jurisdiction to adjudicate is limited to causes
of action which arise only out of the defendant's activities in the
forum.8
Neither general nor limited jurisdiction originated with Come-
lison, but it was Cornelison which set the capstone on the devel-
opment of these theories of jurisdiction. General jurisdiction in
California is traceable to the decision of the court of appeal in Ko-
ninklijke L.M. v. Superior Court.9 However, limited jurisdiction
and the interaction of general and limited jurisdiction have a
more diffuse history.10 Both were clearly foreshadowed in such
5. Id. at 147, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
6. Id.
7. Curiously, it was the dissent which coined the phrase "limited jurisdic-
tion" to fit the majority's definition of the concept. The three dissenters (Justices
Clark, McComb and Richardson) did not take issue with the majority's formula-
tions of general and limited jurisdiction but with the conclusion that the defend-
ant's activities in California were causally connected with the cause of action sued
on. As we will see below (see text accompanying notes 156-66 infra), the causal
connection of the forum-based activities of the defendant to the litigation should
not have been at issue in Cornelison. Thus, unfortunately, the dissent merely
deepened the quagmire.
8. The focus of limited jurisdiction is plainly directed at forum-based activi-
ties. So much is clear from such phrases as "the cause of action must arise out of
an act done or transaction consummated in the forum" and the "crucial inquiry
concerns the character of defendant's activity in the forum." See note 4 supra.
Reference to the test in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), that the defendant
"must perform some other act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities in the forum" (see note 4 supra) could conceivably
have expanded limited jurisdiction to include situations where the defendant took
"voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state." Rosenblatt v.
American Cyanamid Co., 86 S.Ct. 1, 4, 15 LEd.2d 39 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice, in
chambers), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 110 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 1002
(1966) (citing Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm, 4 ILL. LF. 515, 549 (1963). See
also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). This link could have been easily
forged in the familiar case of the out-of-state manufacturer whose products are
sold in the state, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). But the California courts of appeal have not done this
and have confined limited jurisdiction to instances where an act or transaction has
been consummated in the forum. See note 152 infra.
9. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
10. In the sense that limited jurisdiction is predicated on an act or business
done in the forum, it has rather prominent parentage. See note 38 infra and ac-
landmark decisions as Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court1 1
and Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court.12
This article suggests that general-limited jurisdiction is neither
a sound theory nor a useful analytical tool. First, this article will
briefly note the historical origins of general and limited jurisdic-
tion as those concepts have been articulated by California courts.
Second, both concepts will be compared with the current law of
personal jurisdiction. Third, several California appellate deci-
sions which have applied general and limited jurisdiction will be
analyzed to substantiate the thesis of this article. Finally, the al-
ternatives to general and limited jurisdiction will be noted.
I. HISTORY
A. General Jurisdiction
Koninklijke L.M. v. Superior Court13 was the first modern case
which expressly grounded the jurisdiction of a California court on
what the Cornelison court called "general jurisdiction" twenty-
five years later.14 In Koninklijke, an airplane crash occurred in
England and an action was filed in California by the heirs of the
persons killed in the accident. After concluding that the defend-
ant airline's substantial and longstanding activity in California es-
tablished its corporate presence in California for jurisdictional
purposes, the court found it to be immaterial that the subject mat-
companying text. In the sense that it is seen as an alternative to general jurisdic-
tion it is traceable to a few decisions (see note 39 infra) which include most
prominently Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
11. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959).
12. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
13. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
14. 16 Cal. 3d at 147, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355. It is noteworthy that
the reference to general jurisdiction in Cornelison is rather casual: it comes as
something of an aside. See note 4 supra. It was, in fact, not the first time that the
term general jurisdiction was used by a California court. The court of appeal in
Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 31 Cal. App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744
(1973), after noting that the regular, continuous and substantial conduct of busi-
ness within a state subjects that foreign corporation to that state's jurisdiction, ob-
served that the trial court had impliedly found that appellant had failed to
establish the factual predicate for general jurisdiction of the forum over the per-
son of respondents based upon the concept of doing business within the state.
However, Arnesen, unlike Cornelison, did not relate general jurisdiction to Konin-
klijke L.M. v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951) or Perkins v.
Benquet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1962). Furthermore, the Arnesen reference to
general jurisdiction has been ignored in favor of Cornelison's more elaborate state-
ment by the California courts of appeal. See notes 33 and 34 infra. As will be de-
veloped below, California's general jurisdiction is substantially different from the
term by the same name originated by Professors von Mehren and Trautman in Ju-
risdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
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ter of the action was "wholly unrelated to any of the business
conducted by the [airline] in this state." The court held the cor-
poration to be subject to the jurisdiction of California courts.'5
Koninklijke represents a significant break with a line of Califor-
nia decisions which had held that jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration could be asserted only if the cause of action sued on
arose from business transacted within the state. 16 There is, how-
ever, no suggestion in the opinion that the court intended to do
anything other than announce that corporate presence could con-
fer jurisdiction over causes of action having no nexus to the fo-
rum.' 7 Yet six years before the Koninklijke opinion, the United
States Supreme Court declared in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington18 that to say the corporation is "present ... is to beg the
question to be decided."19 "Presence," the Court had declared,
was only "symbolic" of the activities of the foreign corporation.
The "quality and nature" of those activities were to be determina-
tive of the question of jurisdiction. 20 However in spite of, or per-
15. 107 Cal. App. 2d at 501, 237 P.2d at 333.
16. The decision in Koninklijke turned on the court's refusal to follow Fry v.
Denver & R.E. Ry., 226 F. 893 (9th Cir. 1915), which held that jurisdiction could be
asserted over a foreign corporation doing business in California only if the cause
of action arose from business done in the state. In so holding, Fry followed Old
Wayne Mutual Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907) and Simon v. Southern Ry.,
236 U.S. 115 (1915) which, as noted in the Koninklijke decision, had not gone un-
challenged for the thirty-six years they had held sway in California. In rejecting
Fry, Koninklijke relied on Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E.
915, 159 N.Y.S. 1145 (1917), an opinion authored by Justice Cardozo, which held
that if a corporation was engaged in business within the forum state, "jurisdiction
does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to
the business here transacted." Tauza did in fact have a west coast predecessor in
Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Roller, 100 F. 738 (9th Cir. 1900) where the court, construing
California law, had held that jurisdiction could be asserted over a cause of action
which had arisen wholly in Colorado as long as the defendant corporation had
been doing business in California. Roller, however, was not followed in California.
For an excellent history of Denver, Fry and Konkinklijke, see The Development of
In Personam Jurisdiction Over Individuals and Corporations in California: 1849-
1970, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1105, 1136-39 (1970).
17. In holding that presence was an appropriate basis for the assertion of state
court jurisdiction, Koninklijke relied on West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. 2d 720, 182 P.2d 777 (1942) which had signalled the rejection of the consent
theory of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in favor of the notion that exten-
sive business activities created a corporate presence in this state. The step which
Koninklijke took was to hold that such presence supported the assertion of juris-
diction over causes of action without any nexus or affiliation to the California fo-
rum.
18. 18 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. at 316-17.
haps because of this holding, the Koninklijke court stoutly
managed to ignore International Shoe: it was not cited nor was a
trace of its philosophy discernible in the opinion.
Fortuitously, Koninklijke was followed the very next year by
Perkins v. Benquent Consolidated Mining Co.21 In this case, the
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio court could con-
stitutionally exercise its jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
which had conducted systematic and continuous activity in Ohio.
However, the cause of action sued on had no connection to the
corporation's activities in Ohio nor to the state itself.22 Unlike Ko-
ninklijke L.M. v. Superior Court, the decision in Perkins took ex-
plicit account of International Shoe in holding that the
enforcement of "a cause of action not arising out of the corpora-
tion's activities in the state of the forum"23 met the realistic
reasoning of International Shoe24 when the foreign defendant en-
gaged in systematic and continuous corporate activities in that
state.25 Thus, jurisdiction was upheld despite the fact that the
cause of action arose outside the state.
Perkins and Koninklijke can be understood in two ways. First,
these decisions may mean that systematic activity in the forum
21. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
22. Id. at 447-48. It appears that the Benquet Mining Company could not be
sued in the Philippines, its country of incorporation, because of the Japanese oc-
cupation of that nation, and Ohio was the only available forum--or the forum
which was the most reasonable alternative to the Philippines. See Developments
in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L. REV. 909, 932 (1960). Konin-
klijke involved the Dutch national airline KLM which had done considerable busi-
ness in California without becoming a California corporation. Circumstances
arising from the war could not have affected Koninklijke, however, since the litiga-
tion seems to have arisen after 1945. Moreover, KLM had maintained an office in
California since 1938. For that matter, by the time Perkins was decided, the war
had ended and the Japanese were gone from the Philippines. Be that as it may,
both decisions involved corporations which were foreign nationals and thus rela-
tively difficult to reach in their countries of incorporation. It has been observed in
the instance of Perkins that this circumstance may have influenced the decision in
that case id. at 932. See also Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
23. 342 U.S. at 446.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 448-49. The Court in International Shoe had noted that there had
been "instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U.S. at 318.
In support, the Court cited Missouri K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565, (1920)
and Justice Cardozo's opinion for the court in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915, 159 N.Y.S. 1145 (1917). Of course, in International Shoe the
cause of action sued on, i.e. the State of Washington's attempt to collect assess-
ments for the state unemployment compensation fund, arose directly from the cor-
poration's activities in Washington. The Court's comments on these prior
decisions are therefore dictum; their continued validity is examined in Part III be-
low.
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creates a corporate presence and that jurisdiction can be based
solely on this presence. Second, these decisions could be con-
strued to hold that the activities of a foreign corporation, although
not connected to the cause of action sued on, could be contacts
with the forum which meet the requirements of International
Shoe. The first explanation is rejected by International Shoe it-
self: the Court declared the quality and nature of the activity
rather than fictional "presence" to be determinative. 26 The sec-
ond has been criticized by writers 27 and questioned in at least two
decisions of the ninth circuit.2 8 Whether the view upon which the
second explanation rests is sound will be examined by this article
in Part II below.
It has never been clear whether California adopted the first or
the second explanation of Perkins and Koninklijke.29 What is
clear is that since Koninklijke, California has consistently fol-
26. International Shoe, relying on Judge Learned Hand's opinion written in
Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert, 45 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1930) declared "presence" to
be merely a symbol or, in Judge Hand's earlier words, shorthand for corporate ac-
tivities upon which jurisdiction could be predicated in conformance with the re-
quirements of due process, 326 U.S. at 316-17. In the opinion of at least two
distinguished commentators, the fiction of corporate presence as conferring juris-
diction was discredited even before International Shoe by Judge Hand's reasoning
in Hutchinson. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 241, 273 (1965); Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and
In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 583 (1958). Thus,
the conclusion is amply warranted that International Shoe meant an abandon-
ment of the corporate presence theory of jurisdiction. See generally Developments
in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 923 (1960).
27. Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966); Development in the Law-State Court Ju-
risdiction, supra note 10, at 932; Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations
Based on a Single Act: A New Solefor International Shoe, 47 GEO. L.J. 342, 353-54
(1958); Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 398 (1955).
28. Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1974);
L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1959). Re-
search has not uncovered a California state decision questioning Perkins. On the
contrary, Perkins is cited by the California Supreme Court in two decisions impor-
tant to the subject of this paper: Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1976) and Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d
1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). The courts of appeal continue to rely upon Perkins, Sand-
ers v. CEG Corporation, 95 Cal. App. 3d 779, 157 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1979) and Star Avi-
ation, Inc. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 807, 141 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1977).
29. Some decisions hold presence alone to be sufficient for the assertion of ju-
risdiction.
The rule equates extensive economic activity within the state with physi-
cal presence and adheres to the viewpoint that a nonresident who is pres-
ent in California, economically, like a person who is present, physically,
can be sued in this state's tribunals as to any cause of action arising in
lowed the view that systematic and wide-ranging business activity
in this state will allow California courts to assert jurisdiction over
causes of action having no connection with those activities inside
the state.30 Thus, by the time Cornelison was decided, nothing re-
mained but to give the baby a name.31 In Cornelison, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did just that, clearly relating the term
"general jurisdiction" to the line of decisions commencing with
Koninklijke.32
California even though the cause of action is not related to the nonresi-
dent's economic activity in California.
Ratcliffe v. Pedersen, 51 Cal. App. 3d 89, 96, 123 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1975); accord, Mes-
serschmidt Development v. Crutcher Resources, 84 Cal. App. 3d 819, 149 Cal. Rptr.
35 (1978). Others, including Cornelison itself, inquire whether the economic activ-
ity is "a constitutionally sufficient relationship to warrant jurisdiction for all
causes of action" asserted against the foreign defendant. Accord, Cornelison v.
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 147, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976); Star Aviation,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 807, 141 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1977); Henderson v.
Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978). Whether extensive
business activity is or should be a constitutionally sufficient relationship is ex-
amined below. See section II.C.3. infra.
30. See generally Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d
832, 74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969); Long v. Mishicot Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60
Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967); H. Liebes and Co. v. Erica Shoes, Inc., 237 Cal. App. 2d 25, 46
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1965); Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d 559, 27
Cal. Rptr. 371 (1963); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d
1 (1959); Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130
(1953); Schultz v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 169, 257 P.2d 1003 (1953); Le
Vecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1956) (applying
California law); Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (apply-
ing California law). Cf. Pope v. National Aero Finance Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 709, 33
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963).
Of these cases, Fisher Governor is particularly authoritative; speaking for the
court was Mr. Justice Traynor. Buckeye Boiler also confirmed the point. Post-
Buckeye cases supporting this principle are: Ratcliffe v. Pedersen, 51 Cal. App. 3d
89, 123 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1975); Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 31 Cal.
App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1973); Vibration Isolation Products, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat. Rubber Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1972). For other post
Cornelison cases in accord, see note 34 infra.
31. As noted, it was actually Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 31
Cal. App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1973), which first appears to have used the
term general jurisdiction in the sense in which Cornelison employed it. See note
14 supra. To what extent either the Arnesen or Cornelison court was influenced
by von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 14, in the choice of this term is impossi-
ble to say. Professors von Mehren's and Trautman's important work was cited by
the California Supreme Court in Buckeye Boiler, but only generally for its views
on the question of forum conveniens. Arnesen does not cite von Mehren's and
Trautman's article but Cornelison does for the proposition that the interstate na-
ture of the defendant's business, as in Cornelison, could tip the balance in favor of
requiring him to defend in California. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal.
Rptr. at 356. It may well be, although this is pure speculation, that the term "gen-
eral jurisdiction" to describe assertions of state court jurisdiction over causes of
action unrelated to the forum found its way from von Mehren's and Trautman's
article into California case law. The article was obviously known to California ap-
pellate courts.
32. 16 Cal. 3d at 147-48, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (1976).
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B. Limited Jurisdiction
Limited jurisdiction is everything general jurisdiction is not. As
the court of appeal stated in Henderson v. Superior Court: "Juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant served with process outside
the state is classified as either general or limited."33 Other recent
decisions are in accord.34 Though it may not be helpful, Califor-
nia's limited jurisdiction can be easily defined as all assertions of
jurisdiction except those where jurisdiction is based on system-
atic and continuous business activity.
The origin of the notion that limited jurisdiction is the exclusive
alternative to general jurisdiction is traceable to Buckeye Boiler v.
Superior Court:
[U]nless the defendant's forum-related activity reaches such extensive or
wide-ranging proportions as to make the defendant sufficiently 'present' in
the forum state to support jurisdiction over it concerning causes of action
which are unrelated to that activity . . . the particular cause of action
must arise out of or be connected with the defendant's forum-related ac-
33. 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 590, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (1978) (emphasis added).
Reference to either general or limited jurisdiction as applicable to jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant served with process outside the state might suggest, how-
ever indirectly, that general and limited jurisdiction are thought to be applicable
only when the transactional event giving rise to the cause of action occurred
outside California. This possibility is discussed below, see text accompanying
notes 118-38 infra. Suffice it to say here that no such limitation is placed on these
terms by Cornelison nor any cases decided by the courts of appeal in terms of
Cornelison. See note 34 infra. That, of course, does not preclude the possibility
that the courts make reference to these terms only when the transactional event
occurred outside California. In fact, that is the case; see note 120 infra.
34. See generally, E.I.C., Inc. v. Bank of Virginia, 108 Cal. App. 3d 148, 153, 166
Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1980); Spirits, Inc. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 918, 923,
164 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (1980) ("Personal jurisdiction may be exercised under either
of two categories, general or limited."); Star Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Court, 73
Cal. App. 3d 807, 811, 141 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1977). The E.IC. and Spirits, Inc., deci-
sions refer to the concepts of general and limited jurisdiction in the alternative ei-
ther without making it clear that they are thought of as exclusive alternatives or
without clearly labeling the concept discussed as general or limited jurisdiction.
R.E. Sanders & Co. v. Lincoln Richardson Enterprises, Inc., 108 Cal. App. 3d 71, 77-
78, 166 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272-73 (1980); Thomas J. Palmer, Inc. v. Turkiye Is Bankasi
A.S., 105 Cal. App. 3d 135, 147-48, 164 Cal. Rptr. 181, 188-89 (1980); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Unochrome International, Ltd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 518, 524-25, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 760-61 (1980); Sanders v. CEG Corp., 95 Cal. App. 3d 779, 784, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 252, 255 (1979); Messerschmidt Development Co. v. Crutcher Resources
Corp., 84 Cal. App. 3d 819, 825, 149 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1978); Stanley Consultants, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 444, 449-50, 453 (dissent), 143 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658-
59, 660 (dissent); Mathes v. National Utility Helicopters Ltd., 68 Cal. App. 3d 182,
189, 137 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (1977); Spokane Eye Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 63
Cal. App. 3d 548, 552-53, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839-40 (1976); Inselberg v. Inselberg, 56
Cal. App. 3d 484, 490, 128 Cal. Rptr. 578, 581 (1976).
tivity.3
5
A review of California case law antedating Buckeye reveals no
precedent for its alternative phrasing: "[Ulnless the defendant's
forum-related activity reaches ... extensive proportions ... the
particular cause of action must arise out of or be connected with
the defendant's forum-related activity." 36 As we have seen, gen-
eral jurisdiction established itself prior to Buckeye as a doctrine,
albeit without that name, and the courts made frequent reference
to it. 37 However before Buckeye, the courts also examined trans-
actions to determine if limited jurisdiction existed, i.e., whether
the cause of action sued on arose out of activity in California. 38
Sometimes the same decision referred to extensive business ac-
tivity which would confer jurisdiction over all causes of action
and inquired whether the cause of action arose out of activity in
California. 39 It was not until Buckeye that it was suggested that
one was the exclusive alternative of the other.
The development of a "rule," especially when it is suggestive of
a general theory, can be fatal to analysis. So it was with the jux-
taposition of the phrase "the particular cause of action must arise
out of or be connected with the defendant's forum-related activ-
ity" to the emerging concept of general jurisdiction. The juxtapo-
sition suggests that the two, when put together, provide a
conceptual framework which could accommodate all problems of
state court jurisdiction.
35. 71 Cal. 2d at 898-99, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (1969) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). In Fisher Governor, the supreme court found that the
causes of action sued on in that case were not related to any business done in Cal-
ifornia by the Fisher Governor Company. 53 Cal. 2d at 224, 347 P.2d at 3, 1 Cal.
Rptr. at 3. The Fisher court went on to state the already familiar principle that if
the business activity was extensive enough, jurisdiction could be asserted over
causes of action which had no relationship to the defendant's activities in the
state. 53 Cal. 2d at 225, 347 P.2d at 3, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3. In support, the court cited
Perkins, Koninklijke L.M., and that portion of International Shoe which cited
Tauza. See note 25 supra and Le Vecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 233
F.2d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1956), a decision which relied on Koninklijke and Perkins.
Nothing in Fisher Governor, or any of the cases which it cited, supported the alter-
native and exclusive phrasing used by the Buckeye court. Certainly, the reference
to Tauza and other like decisions by International Shoe could not be read to sug-
gest the phrasing employed: Tauza and company were simply cited as exemplify-
ing one additional form of state court jurisdiction, albeit not one suggested by the
facts of the International Shoe case.
36. 71 Cal. 2d at 899, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (emphasis added).
37. See generally pre-Buckeye cases cited in note 30 supra.
38. Several prominent predecessors of Buckeye did just that: Empire Steel
Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961); Henry
Jahn & Sons v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958); Cosper v. Smith
& Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959).
39. Fisher Governor Co., v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1959) and Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265
P.2d 130 (1953).
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While it is altogether probable that the alternative phrasing em-
ployed in Buckeye was purely unintentional, and while Cone-
lison does not unequivocally refer to general and limited
jurisdiction as mutually exclusive and alternative concepts, 40 the
idea suggested by this phrasing was apparently too tempting to
ignore. Some of the state courts of appeal and some federal
courts applying California law4 ' have adopted general-limited ju-
risdiction as an all-embracing theory of state court jurisdiction.
As of this date, thirteen decisions of the California courts of ap-
peal have resorted to the Cornelison general-limited jurisdiction
scheme.4 2 When guided by this theory, a court will first examine
whether the foreign defendant is subject to the general jurisdic-
tion of California courts, i.e., whether it has conducted extensive
business activity within the state. If general jurisdiction is not
found to exist, and this has been invariably the case,43 the court
will then consider whether it can exercise limited jurisdiction. As
we will see below, the plausibility of this general theory is as de-
ceptive as it is mistaken in its basic assumptions.
II. GENERAL AND LIMITED JURISDICTION AND THE LAw
A. Recent Developments: The Focus on Minimum Contacts
It is not intended here to add to the general literature on Shaf-
fer v. Heitner,44 but rather to abstract from that important deci-
sion and from an even more recent opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, Rush v. Savchuk,4 5 two principles which bear di-
rectly on general and limited jurisdiction. First, the International
Shoe minimum contacts doctrine is applicable to all assertions of
state court jurisdiction, and second, jurisdictional analysis must
40. It is possible to construe Cornelison's exposition of limited jurisdiction to
have been intended as an exclusive alternative to general jurisdiction: "If ... the
activities . .. [do] not ... justify the exercise of general jurisdiction... then ju-
risdiction depends on the quality and nature of his activity in the forum in relation
to the particular cause of action." 16 Cal. 3d at 147-48, 545 P.2d at 356, 127 Cal. Rptr.
at 356 (emphasis added) cited without deletions in note 4 supra. However, if one
is to give the benefit of the doubt to the Buckeye court that the alternative phras-
ing may have been unintentional, there is no reason to be any less generous with
Cornelison.
41. See note 3 supra.
42. See notes 33 and 34 supra.
43. This point is discussed in section UI.C.4. infra.
44. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
45. 100 S.Ct. 571 (1980).
focus on the relationship between the defendant, the forum and
the litigation.
Shaffer could not be clearer on the first point. In rejecting the
mere presence of property as a sufficient basis to assert jurisdic-
tion over the absent owner, the Court held that all assertions of
state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stan-
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.46 If there
had been any doubts that the Supreme Court meant what it
said,47 Rush set those doubts to rest. In Rush, the Court swept
aside Seider v. Roth48 and Harris v. Balk49 or what remained of
either by clearly holding that even assertions of quasi in rem ju-
risdiction are to be subjected to the minimum contacts analysis.5 0
Therefore, we should take as settled that California's general and
limited jurisdiction must conform to the constitutional minimum
contacts standard.5 '
Shaffer also clearly holds,52 and Rush reaffirms,5 3 that in deter-
mining whether a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on the rela-
tionship between the litigation, the forum and the defendant. To
illustrate this concept, in Rush the litigation was based on a ve-
hicular accident which had occurred in Indiana. The forum cho-
sen by the plaintiff was Minnesota. The defendant, originally an
Indiana resident as was plaintiff, had moved to Pennsylvania after
the Minnesota action had been commenced. The defendant mi-
nor's father was the owner of the car involved in the accident.
State Farm, insurer of the vehicle,5 4 transacted business in Min-
46. 433 U.S. at 212.
47. As a sampling of courts and commentators shows, the cited holding was
generally accepted at face value. E.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc. 575
F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp.
1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 448 F.
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Cf. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978). Riesenfeld, Shqffer v. Heit-
ner: Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1203-04 (1979);
Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L.R. 997 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 64-65 (1978).
48. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
49. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
50. 100 S.Ct. at 577-79.
51. This, of course, is especially true by virtue of California's long-arm statute,
Code ofJivil Procedure section 410.10: "A court of this state may exercise juris-
dicti6 on any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this State or of the
United States." CAI. CrV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
52. 433 U.S. at 204.
53. 100 S.Ct. at 577.
54. Id. at 574.
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nesota and in all 50 States and the District of Columbia.55 Against
this background, the Supreme Court found that there were no
contacts between the defendant and the Minnesota forum, and
that there were no significant contacts between the state and the
litigation.56 In other words, the presence of the defendant's in-
surer in Minnesota did not establish the required relationship be-
tween the defendant, the forum and the litigation.
The extension of the minimum contacts theory to all assertions
of state court jurisdiction and the formulation that there must be
a relationship between the defendant, the forum and the litigation
validates the views expressed in Professors von Mehren's and
Trautman's Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis.57
That seminal work focuses its analysis on the question whether a
constitutionally sufficient relationship or minimum contact exists
between the forum, on the one hand, and the defendant and the
litigation, on the other. Rejecting the traditional divisions of in
personam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, von Mehren and
Trautman propose a distinction between assertions of jurisdiction
based on the relationship of the legal person to the forum as op-
posed to assertions of jurisdiction predicated on the relationship
of the controversy to the forum.5 8 In the former instance, all
causes of action, whether or not they are connected to the forum,
may be asserted against the defendant in that forum.5 9 This type
of jurisdiction the professors call general jurisdiction. 60 Specific
jurisdiction covers situations where jurisdiction is based on the
relationship of the controversy to the forum.61 In either event,
there must be a constitutionally sufficient affiliation, i.e., a mini-
mum contact between the forum on one hand and the defendant
or the litigation, on the other. As we will see below, 62 von Mehren
and Trautman further defined the term "constitutionally sufficient
affiliation" by distinguishing directly from indirectly affiliating cir-
cumstances-a particularly significant distinction which foreshad-
55. Id. at 575 n.4.
56. Id. at 577-78.
57. Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HI-.v. L. REV. 1121 (1966).




62. See text accompanying notes 87-95 infra.
owed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in both
Shaffer and Rush.
Noting the difference between forum-defendant relationships
and forum-litigation relationships greatly facilitates analysis. As
an example, it clarifies that a court will assert its jurisdiction over
the forum's domiciliary for a different reason than over the non-
resident who has committed a tort in that forum. In forum-de-
fendant relationships, jurisdiction is exercised possibly because
there should be at least one forum which has the power to adjudi-
cate any and all claims against a legal person. 63 In forum-litiga-
tion relationships, jurisdiction is asserted because the forum has
a natural interest in adjudicating controversies that have a rela-
tion or effect in the forum.
Even without the benefit of von Mehren's and Trautman's anal-
ysis, it is clear that the focus of modern jurisdictional analysis
must be on the affiliation of the defendant and the litigation to the
forum. The importance of this observation will become more evi-
dent by analyzing general and limited jurisdiction in terms of cur-
rent jurisdictional concepts.
B. The Restatement and the Comments of the Judicial Council
Before turning to an analysis of general and limited jurisdiction,
it is necessary to sketch the general doctrinal framework within
which these concepts should function. In California, that frame-
work is provided by Code of Civil Procedure, section 410.10 and
the official Comment of the Judicial Council [hereinafter cited as
Comment] to that section.64
Section 410.10 explicitly anchors California's law of jurisdiction
63. This is the rationale most commonly given for the assertion of general ju-
risdiction. See von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137; Vernon, Single-
Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 1978 Wash. L.Q. 273, 304; Developments in the Law--State-Court Juris-
diction, supra note 26, at 934.
64. [1969] JrD. Coumcn. REP. 33-34, 68-91 [hereinafter cited as Comment]. The
Comment is not law in the sense of being an enactment of the legislature. As the
court of appeal explained in Quattrone v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 302,
118 Cal. Rptr. 548, 554 (1975):
In its 1969 Annual Report to the Governor and the Legislature, the Judicial
Council of California commented at length upon the effect of Code of Civil
Procedure section 410.10. Its comment in that respect is reprinted as an
annotation to Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10 in West's Annotated
California Codes. A little over a year after the effective date of section
410.10, the court of appeal in National Life of Florida v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. App. 3d 281, 286-87, 98 Cal. Rptr. 435, 442 (1971), analyzed the facts of
that case in light of "two of the several bases of judicial jurisdiction
spelled out in the approved Judicial Council comments relating to section
410.10." Another early case, Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792,
799, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 554 (1972) cited Witkin's conclusion that the "recog-
nized bases of judicial jurisdiction are those listed in the Restatement
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to constitutional doctrines. 65 The Comment, following the lead of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws [hereinafter cited
as Restatement] ,66 lists the so-called bases of jurisdiction over in-
dividuals and corporations. 67 These bases of jurisdiction are illus-
trative of the affiliations or relationships which will justify the
assertion of jurisdiction. As one panel of the California courts of
appeal has acutely observed: "[W]her. we speak of the requisite
'minimum contacts' which give a state the power to exercise juris-
diction over an individual we speak in terms of those 'contacts'
with the state which the Restatement recognizes as the bases of
judicial jurisdiction." 68
The realization that the Restatement's jurisdictional bases are
in effect the recognized form's of minimum contacts is absolutely
essential to an understanding of the place which the jurisdictional
bases occupy in the framework of jurisdictional concepts. These
jurisdictional bases are particularized illustrations of the inclu-
sive minimum contacts concept.6 9 In other words, the minimum
contacts concept is a common denominator to all of the jurisdic-
tional bases. Thus, a jurisdictional base is a particular kind of
minimum contact which is the equivalent of a relationship or affil-
iation supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.70
[RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS] and that these have, in es-
sence, been incorporated in Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10."
To the extent that California courts have consistently referred to the Comment
as approved or recognized it may be that the Comment has been received as a
part of the state's common law. See also Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d
38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976).
65. See note 51 supra.
66. The bases of jurisdiction over individuals and corporations appearing in
the Comment are those listed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 27, 41-52 [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The substance of the com-
mentary on these bases of jurisdiction provided by the Judicial Council draws
very heavily on the comments to the various sections of the Restatement. See Ab-
bott Power Corp. v. Overhead Electric Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 272, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1976).
67. Comment, supra note 64, at 79-82.
68. Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 800, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 483
(1972).
69. Writing in 1965, Professor Hazard suggested that the "vagueness of the
minimum contacts general principle" could be resolved by a "technique of particu-
larization" within the general minimum-contacts framework. He suggested that
this technique is manifested legislatively in the "long-arm" statutes. A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 283. The jurisdictional bases
as engrafted onto CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973), may be an illustra-
tion of this technique of particularization.
70. "Alternative formulations to 'relatiojnship' may, of course, be employed. So
in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 t1958), Chief Justice Warren referred to 'af-
C. General Jurisdiction
1. A Constitutional Critique
The opinions of the California Supreme Court in Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court7l and Cornelison v. Chaney72 share one in-
teresting characteristic. In both decisions the court refrains from
citing International Shoe when discussing jurisdiction based on
presence, i.e., general jurisdiction. The Court does cite Interna-
tional Shoe,73 Hanson v. Denckla,7 4 and McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co.,75 but only for the alternative theory, i.e., any juris-
diction related to the defendant's activities within the forum-lim-
ited jurisdiction.7 6 This could be dismissed solely as a point of
style, were it not for the fact that occasionally the California
courts of appeal 77 and sometimes a federal court applying Califor-
nia law7 8 have made this feature of the two opinions into binding
dogma.
Relying on Cornelison and Buckeye Boiler, some California
courts have followed the view that jurisdiction based upon mini-
mum contacts exists only where the underlying controversy is
connected with the defendant's forum-related activity.7 9 In other
words, it has been held that the minimum contacts required by
International Shoe as a matter of constitutional imperative apply
only to assertions of limited jurisdiction and can be dispensed
with when California courts are exercising general jurisdiction.
There is some historic justification for this view. Prior to Shaf-
fer v. Heitner,8 0 the conclusion was warranted that physical
presence, however transient, was sufficient for the exercise of ju-
risdiction over all causes of action asserted against the foreign de-
fendant whether or not minimum contacts existed between the
legal person and the forum. The Restatement and the Comment
still reflect that view despite trenchant criticism. 81 After all, a
filiating circumstances' with a state. Other courts speak of a person's 'contacts'
with a state." RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 24, Comment a.
71. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
72. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
73. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
74. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
75. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
76. See note 4 supra and text accompanying note 35 supra.
77. See generally Messerschmidt Development v. Crutcher Resources, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 819, 149 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1978); Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc.,
31 Cal. App. 3d 991, 107 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1973).
78. Thelkeld v. Tucher, 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974).
79. Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 31 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 749.
80. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
81. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction; The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956). The Restatement, how-
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source no less authoritative than International Shoe noted that
the capias ad respondendum [having] given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.8 2
As we have seen,83 Shaffer has made it clear that all assertions
of state court jurisdiction must meet constitutional tests.84 This
must necessarily mean that the Cornelison general jurisdiction
approach must comport with the International Shoe minimum
contacts test, i.e., extensive business activity in the forum must
meet the minimum contacts test. While prior to Shaffer, exten-
sive business activity conferred jurisdiction over causes of action
which were not connected to the forum, such activity must now
establish a relationship between the defendant and the forum. It
is that relationship only which warrants the exercise of jurisdic-
tion.
This raises the question whether jurisdiction may be predicated
only on the defendant's relationship with the forum. Shaffer
clearly held85 and Rush reiterated, 86 that the constitutionality of
the exercise of state court jurisdiction turns on the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation. Is it ever ap-
propriate to predicate jurisdiction on the defendant's relationship
with the forum, especially when the litigation has no relationship
to the forum?
Again, the analytical framework suggested by von Mehren and
Trautman is a helpful guide. The professors distinguish between
two types of general jurisdiction: unlimited general jurisdiction
where the ensuing judgment speaks "without restriction to any of
the judgment debtor's assets" 87 and limited general jurisdiction
ever, concedes that it may be "inconsistent with the basic principle of reasonable-
ness which underlies the field of judicial jurisdiction" to exempt physical presence
from the minimum contacts rule. RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 27, Comment a.
82. 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
83. See text accompanying notes 44-56 supra.
84. Neither Buckeye Boiler nor Cornelison expressly hold the physical pres-
ence of an individual to be the equivalent of the presence of a corporation brought
about by extensive business activity. That was done by the court of appeal in Rat-
cliffe v. Pederson, 51 Cal. App. 3d 89, 123 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1975). See note 29 supra;
accord, Messerschmidt Development v. Crutcher Resources, 84 Cal. App. 3d 819,
825, 149 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1978).
85. 433 U.S. at 204.
86. 100 S. Ct. at 577.
87. Von Meheren and Trautman, supra note 14, at 1136.
where the judgment affects only a "specified fund or assets."88
Furthermore, a distinction is made between "directly affliliating
circumstances" where the "relationship grounding jurisdiction" is
between the person and the forum8 9 and "indirectly affiliating cir-
cumstances" where the relationship is between "a person's assets
or other interests in the forum and the forum." 90 Directly affiliat-
ing circumstances are domicile, habitual residence, presence and
consent.9 1 As far as indirectly affiliating circumstances are con-
cerned, Professors von Mehren and Trautman observe propheti-
cally that: "To base any form of general jurisdiction on indirectly
affiliating circumstances is problematical, particularly in light of
the emergence in recent years of a variety of bases of specific ju-
risdiction."9 2
Shaffer and Rush have converted the problematical into the ac-
tual for both decisions reject indirectly affiliating circumstances
as constitutionally insufficient. In Rush, the plaintiff sought in
substance to invoke limited general jurisdiction since the com-
plaint had been expressly limited to damages not to exceed the
policy limits. 9 3 Because of the defendant's lack of relationship
with Minnesota, jurisdiction had to be based on indirectly affiliat-
ing circumstances, i.e., on the relationship of the forum and the
intangible interest owned by the defendant. 94 Shaffer can also be
viewed as a decision rejecting the assertion of this kind of limited
general jurisdiction based on indirectly affiliating circumstances
because in substance the relationship invoked was between the




91. Id. at 1137.
92. Id. at 1139.
93. 100 S. Ct. at 575. The complaint had originally sought damages in excess of
the policy limits but was reduced by amendment to claim only up to the limit of
the policy. The plaintiff made the nature of the action clear by proceeding under a
Minnesota statute permitting garnishment in order to establish quasi in rem juris-
dicition over a nonresident defendant. Id. at 574 and n.3 accompanying text. This
was clearly an assertion of what von Mehren and Trautman have called limited
general jurisdiction.
94. Id. Again, jurisdiction had to be based on indirectly affiliating circum-
stances between the policy and the forum.
95. In Shaffer, the derivative action sought damages arising from the alleged
misconduct of corporate officers of Greyhound. The complaint was accompanied
by a motion for sequestration which sought to, and did, lead to the seizure of a
considerable number of Greyhound common stock as well as options by means of
stop transfer orders. 433 U.S. at 190-92. The action as fied by the plaintiff was
therefore not one which could be characterized as seeking to assert limited gen-
eral jurisdiction: it was only the motion for sequestration, and not the complaint,
which was limited to the assets present in Delaware. Furthermore, the purpose of
the order of sequestration was to compel personal appearances, id. at 186, which
would have constituted directly affiliating circumstances between the defendants
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Although Rush and Shaffer in effect disapprove of the exercise
of limited general jurisdiction based on indirectly affiliating cir-
cumstances, these decisions need not be read to proscribe the ex-
ercise of unlimited general jurisdiction based on directly
affiliating circumstances such as domicile. There are still compel-
ling arguments supporting the view that certain forms of status
indicate such a relationship between the forum and the legal per-
son which fully warrant the assertion of jurisdiction over that per-
son.96 Of course, it cannot be assumed without analysis that a
particular form of status does indeed justify the conclusion that
there is a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the legal
person and the forum. Whether extensive business activity
should confer such status will be examined below.
97
2. Cornelison or the Restatement: An Easy Choice
We now come to one of the most curious features of California's
doctrine of general jurisdiction: its essential agreement with the
Restatement's and the Comment's "doing business" basis of juris-
diction. Compare the Cornelison general jurisdiction approach to
that portion of the Comment entitled "Doing Business in State -
Foreign Corporation." Cornelison took the following position:
If a nonresident defendant's activities may be described as 'extensive or
wideranging'. . or 'substantial ... continuous and systematic'. . ., there
is a constitutionally sufficient relationship to warrant jurisdiction for all
causes of action asserted against him. In such circumstances, it is not
necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the
defendant's business relationship to the forum.9 8
The Comment took a similar view:
and Delaware. Yet the net effect of the entire proceedings was that property be-
longing to the nonresident defendants was being seized on the rationale that the
property was present in the state. The Court disapproved of the proceedings pre-
cisely because that rationale was insufficient in terms of the minimum contacts
rule. Thus, even if Shaffer is not a case of limited general jurisdiction based on
indirectly affiliating circumstances, that practical effect of the tactics there em-
ployed by the plaintiff was to bring the case perilously close to both concepts.
96. Among such arguments are that there should be at least one forum where
all causes of action may be brought against a legal person, see note 63 supra; that
a forum has an interest in the "economic health of defendants living, organized
and continually functioning in the forum," Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
L.Q. 273, 304 (1978); and arguments to the effect that in the case of presence and
consent the legal system is operating with relatively precise and predictable tests
accompanied in the usual course by other affiliations to the forum, von Mehren
and Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137-38.
97. See section II.C.3. infra.
98. 16 Cal. 3d at 147, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (citations omitted).
(5) Doing Business in State - Foreign Corporation. A state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which does busi-
ness in the state with respect to causes of action that do not arise from the
business done in the state if this business is so continuous and substan-
tial as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction.9 9
If general jurisdiction is synonymous with doing extensive or
wide-ranging business, as it obviously is, the Cornelison general
jurisdiction approach is simply one form or type of minimum con-
tact.1 00 General jurisdiction then fits comfortably into the scheme
of jurisdictional bases enumerated in the Restatement and the
Comment. In fact, it fits so well that the question arises why it is
necessary to speak of general jurisdiction when it is far more de-
scriptive to use the term "extensive business activity."
The answer is that general jurisdiction is used apparently to un-
derline the consequence of extensive business activity which is,
of course, that the forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of
action brought against the defendant whether or not those causes
of action have any relationship to the forum. Yet the Restatement
and the Comment make it clear that extensive business activity is
not the only base of jurisdiction which has this consequence.
Drawing heavily on the Restatement, the Comment informs us
that in the case of individuals, presence, domicile, residence and,
if substantial and continuous, the doing of business in the state,
provide such bases as warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over
any action brought against that person.101 Corporations are sub-
ject to suit as to any and all causes of action if they are incorpo-
rated in the state and, under certain circumstances, if they have
appointed an agent to accept service of process or if they have
done substantial and continuous business in the state.102 There-
fore, several forms of contact with California are thought to confer
jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action which have no connec-
tion to the California forum.
The choice between the Cornelison general jurisdiction ap-
proach and the more broadly gauged view of the Restatement and
the Comment, is not difficult to make. Clearly, the Cornelison
general jurisdiction is simply another name for extensive busi-
ness activity. The term could be ignored as surplusage were it not
for the misleading suggestion, implicit as it may be, that only ex-
tensive business activity permits the bringing of all causes of ac-
tion against the defendant. Plainly, there are other bases of
jurisdiction which also allow it.
99. Comment, supra note 64, at 87 (citation omitted).
100. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
101. Comment, supra note 64, at 71-73, 77.
102. Id. at 85-88.
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3. Should Extensive Business Activity Confer Status?
If general jurisdiction were to be understood as a classification
of the circumstances where courts have exercised a jurisdiction
based on the relationship of the legal person to the forum, then
the term would explain much about the exercise of jurisdiction. It
would then refer to all instances where jurisdiction is predicated
on the existence of a legal relationship between the legal entity
and the forum, i.e., domicile, residence, citizenship in the case of
individuals, and incorporation in the state and appointment of an
agent in the instance of corporations. The focus will now be on
whether or not the affiliation between the legal person and the fo-
rum is of a kind which warrants the imposition of general jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the policies at stake will be laid bare to analysis and
reasoned critique.
On the other hand, if general jurisdiction is simply the
equivalent of sustained economic activity with the effect of forc-
ing a foreign defendant to defend all causes of action brought
against it, several serious questions are raised. First, it seems un-
fair'0 3 to impose liability to defend any and all causes of action on
the basis of a test as imprecise as what constitutes systematic or
wide-ranging doing of business. Incorporation, appointment of an
agent, actual consent, domicile, residence and physical pres-
ence o4 all require that the legal person affiliate itself intention-
ally with the forum. No such clear and unequivocal expression of
intent is required when the corporation is found to be doing sys-
tematic and wide-ranging business. Certainly, no conscious and
deliberate choice has been made to establish a legal relationship
between the legal person and the forum when a court finds, long
after the fact, that the corporation has been doing wide-ranging
business and is therefore sufficiently present in the jurisdiction
for the exercise of general jurisdiction.
Second, if the reason for endowing a state with general jurisdic-
tion is to provide at least one forum for the resolution of all con-
troversies involving a legal entity, 0 5 there seems to be very little
103. We have been recently, and prominently, reminded that one of the impor-
tant components of the minimum contacts concept is "reasonableness" or "fair-
ness." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980).
104. These bases of jurisdiction are enumerated in the Comment supra note 64
at 71, 72, 73, 85, 86.
105. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
reason to expand the already lengthy list of forms of status con-
ferring such jurisdiction.
Third, it has been suggested that Perkins v. Benquet Consoli-
dated Mining Co. and its advocacy of state jurisdiction for sys-
tematic and continuous activity should be limited to its unique
facts. 0 6 It has also been suggested that the decision approves
nothing other than the use of a particular forum "as a surrogate
for the place of incorporation available to any plaintiff."107 This,
coupled with the unfairness of imposing the wide-ranging liability
of general jurisdiction on a foreign entity without the benefit of a
predictable measure or standard or of an intentional choice of
that forum by the affected entity, should argue against the confer-
ral of such status by virtue of sustained economic activity. The
force of these arguments is underlined by the courts' striking re-
luctance to assert general jurisdiction based on extensive busi-
ness activity.
4. General Jurisdiction: Rarely Applied but Not Forgotten
Since the adoption of the California Code of Civil Procedure
section 410.10 in 1970,108 only two cases have been decided which
were based on whole or in part on a finding that a foreign defend-
ant had engaged in such extensive economic activities as to
render it subject to general jurisdiction. Both of these cases were
decided before Cornelison, and both could have been decided on
grounds other than findings of general jurisdiction. In fact, a good
case can be made that both would have been better reasoned de-
cisions had the courts isolated the specific bases upon which Cali-
fornia jurisdiction rested.
In Brandenburg v. New York Tel. and Tel. Co.109 an employee of
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company had been injured, evi-
dently in New York, while on loan to New York Telephone from
Pacific Telephone. The employee, Brandenburg, sued New York
Telephone in California. The California court of appeal reversed
the trial court's order granting New York Telephone's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the defendant's ex-
tensive contacts in California were "substantially in excess of the
106. For the facts of Perkins, see note 22 supra.
107. Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144; and Developments in the
Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 22, at 932.
108. For cases prior to 1970 and after Koninklijke, which approve, if only by
way of dicta, the assertion of California jurisdiction over causes of action uncon-
nected with this forum when the corporate defendant had done extensive busi-
ness here, see note 30 supra. Prior to Koninklijke, the rule had been that
jurisdiction could only be asserted if the cause of action arose from business done
in California. See note 16 supra.
109. 49 Cal. App. 3d 893, 123 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1975).
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necessary minimum contacts."ll0 Although the court of appeal
did not expressly conclude that New York Telephone's activities
in California were systematic or continuous, the decision appears
to be based on New York Telephone's extensive California con-
tacts. The court did not relate Brandenburg's cause of action to
California. The implication therefore is that jurisdiction was
based simply on the defendant's activities in California.
However, New York Telephone's substantial activities in Cali-
fornia related directly to the loan of Brandenburg, a Pacific Tele-
phone plant supervisor to New York Telephone which had lost
the services of a number of employees due to a labor strike. New
York Telephone had established an extensive contractual and ad-
ministrative network in California with Pacific Telephone provid-
ing for the loan of some of the latter's employees to New York
Telephone."] Thus, New York Telephone had clearly "done busi-
ness" in California and a sound argument could be made for the
conclusion that Brandenburg's cause of action arose precisely out
of that business. Had New York Telephone not established the
elaborate machinery in California providing for the loan of Pacific
Telephone employees, Brandenburg surely would not have been
injured in New York while working for New York Telephone.12
In Ratcliffe v. Pedersen,n13 a case decided shortly after Branden-
burg, the court of appeal explicitly based its decision on both the
presence of the nonresident defendant created by his extensive
economic activity in California and on the conclusion that the
plaintiff's cause of action was related and arose from the defend-
ant's doing of business in California. The defendant Pedersen, an
Idaho resident engaged in the importing and resale of foreign
motorcycles, had shipped hundreds of cycles to California, stored
them in a warehouse and released them to Wheeler who had held
himself out to the plaintiff to be Pedersen's business partner.
Ratcliffe's cause of action against Pedersen was for breach of an
oral agreement to make Ratcliffe the northern California distribu-
tor for Pedersen.114
Of course, the court's express holding that Ratcliffe's cause of
action arose from Pedersen's economic activity in California made
110. Id. at 897, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
111. Id. at 896-97, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
112. Id.
113. 51 Cal. App. 3d 89, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 793 (1975).
114. Id. at 92, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
it unnecessary to also find that the same economic activity con-
ferred jurisdiction over causes of action not connected with that
activity. Since the dealings between the plaintiff Wheeler, and
Pedersen were closely intertwined, the court's conclusion that the
cause of action arose out of Pedersen's doing business in Califor-
nia was eminently sound.115 Nevertheless, the court felt con-
strained to declare that "extensive economic activity" is to be
equated with physical presence which, in turn, conferred jurisdic-
tion on California courts "as to any cause of action arising in Cali-
fornia even though the cause of action is not related to the
nonresident's economic activity in California."" 6
Recourse to "presence" a full thirty years after the decision in
International Shoe was retrogressive by the time Ratcliffe was
decided.11 7 After Shaffer, analysis in terms of presence rather
than minimum contacts is plainly in error. However most impor-
tantly, Ratcliffe demonstrates that when the foreign defendant's
activities in California are sufficiently extensive to warrant a find-
ing of general jurisdiction, that relationship will also be sufficient
to support the assertion of jurisdiction when the transactional
event has no connection to that relationship. The court did not
have to go that far in Ratcliffe since the breach of the agreement
sued on was related to the defendant's activities in California.
However, a relationship which is found sufficient for the Corne-
lison general jurisdiction approach must also be a relationship
sufficient to give jurisdiction to California over an act or business
done in California. Thus, if Pedersen had been sued on business
done in California which was not related to his motorcycle sales
in this state, it is hard to imagine that any court would have con-
cluded that he was not subject to California jurisdiction.
5. General Jurisdiction: The Unnecessary Doctrine
Each of the cases applying Cornelison's general jurisdiction, in-
cluding Cornelison itself, could have been decided in the terms of
sections 37 and 50 of the Restatement1 8 and the corresponding
115. Id. at 96, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
116. Id.
117. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
118. § 37. Causing Effects in State by Act Done Elsewhere
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with re-
spect to any cause of action arising from these effects unless the na-
ture of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state
make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 66 § 37. Section 37 is applicable to individuals; § 50,
which has identical wording, is applicable to corporations.
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provisions of the Comment 1' 9 without a single reference to gen-
eral jurisdiction of the Cornelison variety. 120 In each of these
119. Cf. The topical sentence of RESTATMENT, supra note 66 § 37 with that
found in Comment, supra note 64, at 79:
(9) Causing Effect in State by Act or Omission Elsewhere
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who causes effects in the state by an omission or act done else-
where with respect to causes of action arising from these effects, un-
less the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to
the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
(Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235; McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed. 2d 223 (other cita-
tions omitted).
120. In each of these cases the transactional event giving rise to the contro-
versy occurred outside California. Sanders v. CEG Corp., 95 Cal. App. 3d 779,
157 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1979) (action for wrongful death against manufacturer of
hydrohammer: manufactured outside of California but sold in this state by in-
dependent retail sales outlet); Messerschmidt Development v. Crutcher Re-
sources, 84 Cal. App. 3d 819, 149 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1978) (action for breach of
settlement agreement negotiated, executed and performed outside of California);
Henderson v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978) (action
for breach of cohabitation agreement which was entered into and performed solely
in Florida); Stanley Consultants, Inc. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 444, 143
Cal. Rptr. 665 (1978) (action for breach of employment agreement which was nego-
tiated between California plaintiff and corporate defendant headquartered in Iowa
"either by interstate communications or at petitioner's defendant's office in
Iowa."); Star Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 807, 141 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1977) (action for wrongful death: airplane crash occurred in Colorado); Mathes v.
National Utility Helicopters Ltd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 182, 137 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1977) (ac-
tion by administratrix for damages arising from deceased's death which occurred
in a helicopter crash in Indonesia); Spokane Eye Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 63
Cal. App. 3d 548, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976) (action for medical malpractice arising
from allegedly tardy referral of patient to California doctor by State of Washington
eye clinic; referral occurred in Washington); Inselberg v. Inselberg, 56 Cal. App. 3d
484, 128 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1976) (action for enticement of daughter from father's cus-
tody; father resident of California; conduct allegedly amounting to enticement of
daughter's affections occurred in Michigan and partly in the course of telephone
calls from that state to California); E.I.C., Inc. v. Bank of Virginia, 108 Cal. App. 3d
148, 166 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1980) (suit for conspiracy to defraud where all conspirato-
rial acts occurred outside California); R. E. Sanders & Co. v. Lincoln-Richardson
Enterprises, Inc., 108 Cal. App. 3d 71, 166 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1980) (suit, apparently for
breach of a sales agency agreement, by a California business broker where the
agreement was negotiated and partly executed in Missouri and where the prop-
erty to be sold, and the defendants were all in Missouri and Arkansas); Thomas J.
Palmer, Inc. v. Turkiye Is Bankusi A.S., 105 Cal. App. 3d 135, 164 Cal. Rptr. 181
(1980) (litigation connected with the banking activities in Turkey of the defendant
Turkish bank); Spirits, Inc. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 918, 164 Cal. Rptr.
101 (1980) (suit aganist owner of Arizona liquor store by the buyer of a bottle
purchased at the store for injuries sustained when the bottle exploded in Ari-
zona); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Unochrome International, Ltd., 104 Cal. App.
3d 518, 163 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1980) (breach of a contract calling for the construction,
in Michigan, of a furnace).
Decisions ignoring general-limited jurisdiction even though the transactional
cases the transactional event or act giving rise to the controversy
occurred outside California and had an effect in California. Other
courts have addressed such cases solely in terms of sections 37
and 50 of the Restatement.12 1 This gives us in effect two in-
dependent and unrelated lines of authority to deal with the same
kind of problem. That is hardly a desirable state of affairs.
a. Section 37
The jurisdictional base found in section 37 of the Restatement
entitled "Causing Effect in State by Act or Omission Else-
where" 122 requires that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case
be reasonable. 123 Citation to Hanson v. Denckla124 and McGee v.
International Life125 makes it clear that nothing more or less is
meant by this than that the constitutional tests of "minimum con-
tacts" be met. This is certainly in accord with the latest pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court.' 26
In establishing a framework for the analysis of the constitu-
tional question, the Restatement distinguishes between:
three possible situations: (1) the act was done with the intention of caus-
ing effects in the state; (2) the act, although not done with the intention of
causing effects in the state, could reasonably have been expected to do so;
and (3) the act was not done with the intention of causing effects in the
state and could not reasonably have been expected to do SO.
12 7
The first situation is equated to those in which the effects had
resulted from an act done in the forum. 28 It is in the discussion
of the factors underlying the second situation that the Comment
event occurred outside California are: United Cal. Bank v. First Bank of Oak Park,
98 Cal. App. 3d 439, 159 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1979); In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App.
3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. I.C. Deal, 86 Cal. App. 3d 896, 150
Cal. Rptr. 615 (1978); Hill v. Noble Drilling Corp., 61 Cal. App. 3d 258, 132 Cal. Rptr.
154 (1976); Floyd J. Harkness Co. v. Amezcua, 60 Cal. App. 3d 687, 131 Cal. Rptr. 667
(1976); Abbott Power Corp. v. Overhead Electric Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 272, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 508 (1976); Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1976); Flick v. Exxon Corp. 58 Cal. App. 3d 212, 129 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1976); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977) rev'd. Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Sibley v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 442, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1976). In these cases, the courts analyzed the facts in terms of the "jurisdictional
base" which permits the assertion of jurisdiction if the act outside the state had an
"effect" within the state. Comment, supra note 66, 472-74, 481 and the RESTATE-
MENT.
121. See note 120 supra.
122. RESTATMENT, supra note 66, § 37.
123. Id.
124. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
125. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, Reporter's Note.
126. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
127. See generally RESTATEMENT supra note 66, § 37, Comment a.
128. See Abbott Power Corp. v. Overhead Electric Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 272, 131
Cal. Rptr. 508 (1976).
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and the Restatement focus on the foreign legal person's relation-
ship to the forum:
The greater the defendant's relationship to the state, the greater is the
likelihood that the state may exercise judicial jurisdiction over him as to
causes of action arising from the effects of the act in the state,. . . . So if
the defendant does business in the state, or solicits business extensively
in the state, or if a substantial quantity of goods manufactured by him are
sold in the state, there is a greater likelihood that the state may exercise
judicial jurisdiction over him as to causes of action arising from the effects
in the state of an act done by him outside the state than if the defendant
did not have this relationship to the state. This is so even though the de-
fendant's relationship to the state is not related in any way to the act or to
such of its effects in the state as are involved in the suit.
1 2 9
The last sentence must be considered in tandem with the Re-
statement's and the Comment's earlier statements that when "ju-
risdiction over an individual is based solely upon such act or
omission [elsewhere], only a claim for relief arising from such act
or omission may be asserted against the individual."13o The de-
fendant's relationship with the forum is fundamental to the deci-
sion whether the transactional event should be affiliated to the
forum even though that relationship has no connection with the
controversy sued upon. The existence of such a relationship is,
however, a question separate from whether or not the transac-
tional event actually caused the controversy which is being sued
upon.
The importance of the defendant's relationship to the forum has
been long recognized in California. As an example, the relation-
ships created by such factors as solicitation of business or the
sale of goods in the state is in substance the same as the eco-
nomic activity which, according to Buckeye Boiler, would support
the assertion of California jurisdiction over a foreign manufac-
turer whose goods had been sold in this state.131 The test of
economic activity established in Buckeye goes to the question
whether the foreign manufacturer could reasonably have ex-
pected to cause effects in California. 3 2 This is indistinguishable
from the second situation set forth in the cited comment of the
129. Comment, supra note 64, at 81; RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 37, Com-
ment a.
130. Id.
131. 71 Cal. 2d at 901-02, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
132. "If the manufacturer sells its products in circumstances such that it knows
or should reasonably anticipate that they will ultimately be resold in a particular
state, it should be held to have purposefully availed itself of the market for its
products in that state." Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
Restatement.133 Thus, whether analysis is based on the Restate-
ment or California decisional law, the relationship of the foreign
defendant with California is of critical importance. It is, however,
an issue separate and distinct from the question whether the
event giving rise to the controversy is in fact causally connected
with that controversy.
b. Section 37: The Alternative to General Jurisdiction
Now let us see how Cornelison could have been decided in
terms of section 37 of the Restatement. The transactional event in
Cornelison was a vehicular collision which occurred in Nevada.134
Plaintiff, wife of the man killed in the accident, was a California
resident. The defendant trucker was a resident and domicilary of
Nevada. In terms of section 37 of the Restatement, these facts set
the stage for inquiring whether or not the foreign event had any
effect in California. If yes, did the defendant intend that they
have such an effect? If he did not so intend, was it reasonable or
unreasonable to conclude that the event would have such an ef-
fect?135
It was at this point that the defendant's relationship with Cali-
fornia would have become relevant. 36 Note that the relationship
need not have had any nexus with the cause of action. The na-
ture and extent of that relationship would have been considered
only to determine whether it was reasonable to affiliate the litiga-
tion to the forum. Here the court could have concluded that the
defendant's frequent trips to California did in fact establish such
a relationship as made it reasonable to affiliate the litigation to
the forum.
Instead, the court examined the proposition whether the de-
fendant, an interstate trucker, was subject to the general jurisdic-
tion of California courts. It did so by extensive reference13 7 to
Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co. 138 and Koninklijke L.M. v. Superior
Court.'39 Yet neither of these cases can be considered modern
decisions on the subject of state court jurisdiction. 40 In fact, they
133. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
134. 16 Cal. 3d at 146, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
135. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
137. 16 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 545 P.2d at 266-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354-56.
138. 342 U.S. 437 (1962).
139. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
140. As we have seen, Koninklijke simply ignored International Shoe and de-
cided the question of jurisdiction in terms of corporate presence. Even assuming
that presence in and of itself was an adequate base for the assertion of jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation and this assumption is much in doubt, see note 26
supra, it was not a tenable theory after International Shoe. See text accompany-
ing notes 18-20 supra. Perkins has been the subject of scholarly and judicial criti-
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should have been replaced in the Cornelison decision itself by
section 37 of the Restatement.
The most rigorous and intellectually honest application of the
theories of general and limited jurisdiction appears in Henderson
v. Superior Court.14 1 It is in its very fidelity to Cornelison that
Henderson demonstrates the shortcomings of those theories.
In Henderson, the plaintiff was seeking to take advantage of the
Marvin v. Marvin'42 decision by suing the defendant, a domici-
lary and resident of Florida, for breach of an agreement to cohabi-
tate which had been entered into and performed, prior to its
breach, in Florida. The California court of appeal noted explicitly
that the plaintiff's cause of action was related "in its entirety to an
agreement made, activities performed, obligations incurred, and
services rendered as a companion and homemaker during an ex-
tramarital and nonmarital relationship that took place in Flor-
ida."14 3 Thus, the factual predicate for an analysis in light of
section 37 of the Restatement and the parallel section of the Com-
ment,l4 4 was clearly established by the court itself.
Nonetheless, Henderson completely ignored section 37 of the
Restatement. Instead, guided by Cornelison, the decision first
tackled the issue of whether or not the defendant's activities in
California were extensive enough to warrant the imposition of
general jurisdiction. Since the defendant "never came near the
state" but had simply allowed the plaintiff to race horses owned
by him at various events in California for a few months,145 this is-
sue was easily resolved in the negative. 4 6 It is, in fact, resolved
by courts applying Cornelison so easily and inevitably in favor of
the conclusion that general jurisdiction cannot be asserted147 that
it seems somewhat farcical to even pose the question. Of course,
if the court had inquired if the activities in Florida had had an ef-
fect in California it would have set its feet in the path defined by
section 37 and analyzed whether the litigation could be affiliated
to the forum. That the result would have been probably the
cism, see notes 27 and 28 supra, and the soundness of the policies implicated in
the decision are subject to question. See section II.C.3 supra.
141. 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978).
142. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1977).
143. 77 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (1978).
144. Comment, supra note 64, at 79.
145. 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978).
146. Id.
147. See section II.C.4 of the text supra.
same 148 does not detract from the sterility of the approach dic-
tated to the Henderson court by Cornelison.
D. Limited Jurisdiction: The Misplaced Focus
In addition to elevating Koninklijke L.M. v. Superior Court to a
theory of state court jurisdiction, Cornelison also perpetuated a
fateful slip in jurisdictional analysis attributable at least in part to
Buckeye Boiler. This occurred when, after rejecting general juris-
diction over the defendant, the court went on to consider whether
or not the "plaintiff's cause of action . . .arises out of or has a
substantial connection with a business relationship defendant has
purposefully established in California."' 49
This formulation is traceable to Buckeye Boiler where the court,
after noting that presence could confer jurisdiction over causes of
action unrelated to the defendant's activity in the forum, con-
cluded that in other instances "the particular cause of action must
arise out of or be connected with the defendant's forum-related
activity."150
Yet evolving theories of state court jurisdiction have made it
clear that jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident defend-
ant even when that defendant has not engaged in any forum-
based activities. Jurisdiction may be asserted when the nonresi-
dent defendant has done an act outside the jurisdiction which has
had an effect in the jurisdiction.151 While it is possible to read
Cornelison expansively to include as forum-based activities the
effects of an act performed outside the state, not a single decision
of the courts of appeal or the California Supreme Court has done
so. Instead, the appellate courts, in applying Cornelison, have
emphasized the requirement that in all instances where limited
jurisdiction is to be asserted, the cause of action must arise out of
an act or transaction consummated in the forum.152 Thus, Califor-
148. Nothing in the facts suggests that at the time the parties entered into the
cohabitation agreement in Florida they intended, or could reasonably be thought
to have intended, that the agreement have an effect in California. As a matter of
fact, the agreement, and performance thereunder, was terminated when the par-
ties separated prior to the plaintiff's move to California. This then would have
been the third type of situation envisaged by the Restatement, see text accompa-
nying note 126 supra, which does not warrant the assertion of state court jurisdic-
tion. RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 37 Comment a.
149. 16 Cal. 3d at 149, 545 P.2d at 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
150. 71 Cal. 2d at 899, 458 P.2d at 63, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
151. See text accompanying notes 122-29 supra.
152. Star Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App.3d 807, 811, 141 Cal. Rptr.
13, 17: "[Llimited jurisdiction essentially turns upon three factors: (1) whether
the cause of action 'arises from' or is otherwise 'connected with' defendant's fo-
rum-related activities; (2) the burdens on the parties in trying the action in the
forum state; and (3) the interest of the forum state in assuming jurisdiction [citing
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nia's limited jurisdiction must be understood to refer to those in-
stances where the foreign defendant has done an act or done
business in the jurisdiction. In other words, limited jurisdiction is
in reality nothing but the alter ego of two bases of jurisdiction
recognized by the Comment and the Restatement: doing an act,
and doing business, in the forum state. 153
If limited jurisdiction is viewed simply as a surrogate for other
bases of jurisdiction having to do with the defendant's activities
in the forum, then it would be better to analyze the facts by not-
ing that the act or business done in the forum is to be affiliated to
the forum and not to those activities of the defendant which tend
to establish a relationship between the defendant and the fo-
rum.1 5 4 However, since it is only this writer who has equated lim-
ited jurisdiction to the doing of an act or business in California, it
is well to ask whether limited jurisdiction, as formulated by the
state supreme court, is a logical concept.155
We begin and end by noting that the question which is funda-
mental to all jurisdictional inquiries is whether or not there were
such affiliations to the forum as would warrant the assertion of
jurisdiction by that forum. ' 5 6 Why then should we ever seek to af-
filiate the controversy to the defendant's activities in the forum?
The only possible reason to ask this question is to see whether
there is a causal relationship between the acts done in the forum,
and the controversy generated by those acts. However, given
Cornelison] ." It was the dissenting opinion in Cornelison which so handily sum-
marized the lengthy formulation of limited jurisdiction by the majority into the
foregoing three separate elements. For the same faithful reliance on the Come-
lison nexus requirement in Henderson v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978), see text accompanying notes 167-69 infra. Three other deci-
sions follow the nexus rule without referring to limited jurisdiction by that name
when generally describing the dichotomy between the two types of jurisdiction.
Sanders v. Arrow Mfg. Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 779, 157 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1979); Mathes v.
National Utility Helicopters Ltd., 68 Cal. App. 3d 182, 137 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1977); Spo-
kane Eye Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 548, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838
(1976).
153. Comment, supra note 64, at 76-79, 88-89; RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, §§ 35,
36 (individuals) and §§ 48, 49 (corporations).
154. See text accompanying notes 156 and 157 infra. As we have seen, the rela-
tionship between the defendant and forum bears on the question whether it is rea-
sonable, i.e., constitutional to affiliate the controversy to the forum. See text
accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
155. See section I.B. of the text supra.
156. See von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 14, at 1136; see generally Smit,
Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analy-
sis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L J. Comp. L.Q. 335 (1972).
such a causal connection between the defendant's activities and
the cause of action, this still leaves open for decision whether it is
constitutionally permissible to affiliate the controversy to the fo-
rum and to assert jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. As we
have seen the ultimate question is decided by the defendant's re-
lationship to the forum as opposed to the defendant's activities
within the forum. 5 7 Put another way, it is surely wrong to argue
that simply because there is a causal connection between the
transactional event and the controversy, the forum may assert its
judicial jurisdiction.
Again, a look at the facts in Cornelison, and at the court's dispo-
sition of those facts, will illustrate this point. After rejecting gen-
eral jurisdiction as inapplicable, the court turned to consider the
"relation between defendant's activities in California and the
cause of action alleged by Plaintiff."158 Such a relationship was
established, in the court's opinion, by the defendant's "continuous
course of conduct" in driving to and through California.' 59 The ac-
cident arose out of driving the truck which had been "the very ac-
tivity which was the essential basis of defendant's contacts with
this state."'160 There was therefore "a substantial nexus between
plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's activities in Califor-
nia." 161
This chain of reasoning,162 which sparked the dissenting opin-
ion,1 63 omits the important point that the cause of action had to
be affiliated to the forum, and not to the defendant's activities in
the forum. The defendant's activity at the time and place of the
accident is significant only in the sense that it did or did not give
rise to the cause of action. If it did not, the defendant may have a
good defense on the merits 64 but that of course does not go to the
157. See text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.




162. The conclusion that the accident arose out of defendant's activity in the fo-
rum confuses causality with relationship. The accident was caused in significant
part by the defendant having driven his truck to the point of impact. To the extent
that the defendant's acts caused the accident, those acts were all done outside
California. Of course, the defendant had a business relationship with and in Cali-
fornia for some time. His drive on the day of the accident was clearly related to
that business relationship.
163. "The only conceivable connection between plaintiffs cause of action and
defendant's activity inside California is that defendant was rolling toward (and
plaintiff away from) its border." 16 Cal. 3d at 153, 545 P.2d at 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. at
358 (Clark J. dissenting).
164. Thus, the defendant may not have been at the scene of the accident at all
or he may not have been culpable in the sense of having proximately caused the
accident even though he was present.
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issue of jurisdiction. If the activity did give rise to the cause of
action, we can then inquire whether the litigation should be affili-
ated to the forum. The defendant's activities on past occasions
are relevant, as we have seen, in the determination whether his
relationship to California is such as to justify the assertion of ju-
risdiction.165 However, those activities do not have to be causally
connected to the litigation.166
Again, Henderson v. Superior Court167 illustrates the point. Af-
ter rejecting general jurisdiction, Henderson turned to inquire
whether limited jurisdiction could be imposed. This, the court
noted, depended on whether or not "a substantial nexus exists
between plaintiffs cause of action and defendant's activities in
the state."168 This turned on whether the controversy could be
factually linked to the defendant's California based activities.
Finding that defendant's only California based activity had been
to allow plaintiff to race his horses after their cohabitation agree-
ment had been terminated, the court concluded that the contro-
versy was unrelated to the defendant's California activities and
the court declined to approve the assertion of jurisdiction for that
reason.169
All that this finding settled, however, was that the acts or busi-
ness done in California did not give rise to the controversy sued
on. Put another way, the inquiry and the conclusion went only to
the causal connection or the lack of it. It did not settle whether
the controversy could be affliated to the California forum on ju-
risdictional bases other than those predicated on the foreign de-
fendant's activities in California. As an example, had the
defendant done an act in Florida which had an effect in Califor-
nia? This jurisdictional base does not require that the contro-
versy arise from an act done in the state. 7 0 Of course, as we have
seen, the defendant's forum-related activities will have a bearing
on whether it is reasonable to affiliate the controversy to the fo-
rum,1 7 1 but it is not necessary that these activities be related
causally to the controversy sued upon. As we have already noted,
the Henderson court had clearly found that the series of transac-
165. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
166. Id.
167. 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978).
168 Id. at 590, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
169. Id. at 592, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
170. See notes 118 and 119 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
tions which gave rise to the litigation had occurred in Florida172
but, unfortunately, the court followed the path prescribed in
Cornelison rather than section 37 of the Restatement.
However, the case which most clearly demonstrates the error of
seeking to establish a nexus between the cause of action and the
defendant's activity in the forum is Spokane Eye Clinic, Inc. v. Su-
perior Court 73 where the court of appeal held that the referral of
some of its patients to California by an eye clinic in the State of
Washington did not confer limited jurisdiction on California
courts since there was no nexus between the controversy and the
defendant's acts in California.174 There could hardly have been
any other result since the Washington clinic had not done or per-
formed any acts or business in California.175 In other words,
there could be no nexus between the controversy and the defend-
ant's activities for the very good reason that no activities had
taken place in California.
Understandably, the court seems to have been dissatisfied with
this conclusion. After all, an act had occurred outside California
which arguably had had an effect in this state. Thus, after analyz-
ing the facts before it in terms of the Cornelison general and lim-
ited jurisdiction approach and finding both inapplicable, 76 the
court turned without explanation to "[another] basis for jurisdic-
tion" which "arises when a defendant has caused an 'effect' in
this state by an act or omission which occurs elsewhere."' 77 This
was arguably the only theory which fit the facts. It is a theory,
however, which is excluded by the nexus requirement of Corne-
lison's limited jurisdiction.
It was, of course, unnecessary to flounder around with general-
limited jurisdiction before turning to that "other" basis of jurisdic-
tion. Finding no acts or business done in California, the court
could have easily turned to the other basis of jurisdiction without
a single reference to limited or general jurisdiction. As it was,
this court, like some others, 78 left the reader with the impression
that limited jurisdiction was a jurisdictional base on a par with
other bases enumerated by the Comment. This is true only if lim-
ited jurisdiction boils down to doing business or doing an act in
California.
This brings one to a final observation about limited jurisdiction.
172. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
173. 63 Cal. App. 3d 548, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976).
174. Id. at 553, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 552, 553, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 839, 840.
177. Id. at 554, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
178. Inselberg v. Inselberg, 56 Cal. App. 3d 484, 128 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1976).
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If limited jurisdiction is the alter ego of "doing business" and "do-
ing an act" bases of jurisdiction, what need is there for this term?
Why not be satisfied with the Restatement's descriptive and accu-
rate formulations? The adjective "limited" is accurate only in the
sense that jurisdiction based on doing business in the forum is
limited to the cause of action arising from that business. But as
we have seen,179 that means very little in jurisdictional analysis.
There is little doubt about the enduring fidelity of the California
courts of appeal to theories of general-limited jurisdiction. 180
Whether or not its popularity is explained by our affection for the
sonorous phrase or our need for the reassuring touch of a "the-
ory" is hard to say. The fact remains that general-limited jurisdic-
tion is not an all-embracing theory of state court jurisdiction. If
anything, it is a resurrection of Koninklijke L.M. v. Superior
Court'81 and Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.,182 and
an alternative label for the "doing business" or "doing an act" ba-
ses of jurisdiction. As such, it provides a remarkably cramped, if
not outright erroneous, theory of state court jurisdiction.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE TO GENERAL JURISDICTION
When the transactional event has occurred outside Calfornia,
general-limited jurisdiction as spawned by Buckeye Boiler and
179. See text accompanying notes 162-66 supra.
180. Sanders v. CEG Corp., 95 Cal. App. 3d 779, 157 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1979), sets
forth the theory of general-limited jurisdiction in extended detail without, how-
ever, specifically referring to general and limited jurisdiction:
A distinction is made between a cause of action arising out of or in con-
nection with a non-resident defendant's forum-related economic activity
and a cause of action entirely distinct from that activity. When the cause
of action arises out of theforum-related economic activity, the forum state
will entertain jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. An isolated act
of economic activity, such as the making and performance of a contract in
the forum state, may be sufficient to accord the forum state jurisdiction
over the defendant when the cause of action is related to that isolated act
of economic activity .... Where, however, the cause of action is entirely
distinct from the forum-related economic activity, the defendant cannot be
sued in the forum state unless that economic activity has reached '...
such extensive or wide-ranging proportions as to make the defendant suf-
ficiently "present" in the forum state . . .' to support jurisdiction over
him....
These familiar principles have been recently reiterated by the court of appeal in
Goodyear Tire v. Unochrome, 104 Cal. App. 3d 518, 524-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. 758, 761
(1980). There have been five decisions in 1980 alone which refer to general and
limited jurisdiction. See note 34 supra.
181. 107 Cal. App. 2d 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
182. 342 U.S. 437 (1962).
perpetuated by Cornelison should be aborted in favor of a line of
decisions of which Titus v. Superior Court183 and Quattrone v. Su-
perior Court184 are exemplary.
In Titus, the divorced father living in Massachusetts had sent
his children to his ex-wife, then living in California, for the sum-
mer. However, before the children were scheduled to return to
their father, the ex-wife filed an action in California seeking to es-
tablish the Massachusetts decree of divorce as a California judg-
ment and further seeking a modification of that judgment
awarding her custody of the children. 85 The court considered
whether or not the father's act of sending his children to Califor-
nia for the summer fell within the scope of section 37 of the Re-
statement.
The court adopted the Restatement's advice and first consid-
ered if the father had intended that his act of sending the children
to their mother have an effect in California. After concluding he
had had no such intention,186 the court inquired if it was reason-
able to expect, at the time he sent the children, that his action
would have an effect in this state. Assuming, but not deciding,
that the answer to this was in the affirmative, the court carefully
analyzed whether or not the father's relationship to California
was such as to render the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable.
Finding that such jurisdiction was not reasonable, the court con-
cluded that this basis of jurisdiction could not be relied upon by
the plaintiff.' 87
What if general-limited jurisdiction had been applied in Titus ?
The court undoubtedly would have concluded that general juris-
diction did not exist over the defendant.188 This follows because
there were simply no facts upon which general jurisdiction could
have been based; the defendant had no contacts with California
other than sending his children there. Thus, the court would have
been left with limited jurisdiction as the alternative and here the
inquiry would have been whether there was a nexus between the
183. 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972).
184. 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1975).
185. 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 795-96, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480-81 (1975).
186. Id. at 802, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
187. Id. at 804-05, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
188. Lest it be thought that general jurisdiction has not been applied in family
law cases, consider Inselberg v. Inselberg, 56 Cal. App. 3d 484, 128 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1976), an action involving the alleged enticement of a child from her natural fa-
ther. Here the court held that general jurisdiction did not exist, 56 Cal. App. 3d at
490, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 581, and then did as the court in Spokane Eye Clinic, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 548, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 173-77 supra. It turned without explanation to section 37 of the Restate-
ment but rejected it as a basis of jurisdiction. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 490-91, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 582.
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controversy and the defendant's activities in California. As there
were clearly no activities in California, the court would have had
to follow the Henderson'8 9 court and abort further analysis at that
point. In the alternative, the court would have taken the Spokane
Eye Clinic'9 0 option and finally turn to section 37 of the Restate-
ment. In other words, after a great deal of useless talk about gen-
eral and limited jurisdiction the court would have decided Titus
on the very basis on which that decision actually rests.
Quattrone v. Superior Court1 91 is another decision admirable in
its analysis and application of section 37 of the Restatement.
Here the foreign defendant was an individual who had partici-
pated in the preparation of misleading financial reports generated
by Crown Aluminum Industries Corp., a subsidiary acquired by
plaintiff Whittaker Corporation in 1967. Whittaker was a Califor-
nia corporation with its principal office in Los Angeles; Quattrone,
the foreign defendant, had worked for Crown from 1963 to 1972 in
Pennsylvania and had lived in that state. At the time of the ac-
tion, he was working in Pennsylvania where he was a registered
voter. He denied doing business in California or receiving any in-
come from California corporations or businesses.192 The acts sur-
rounding the preparation of the financial reports, which had
caused Whittaker to issue reserve shares-including some to
Quattrone-when none should have been issued, took place in
Pennsylvania from 1968 to 1972.193 True to section 37 and the ana-
lytical scheme there suggested, the Quattrone court first inquired
whether or not these acts outside California were intended to
have an effect in the state. Answering this in the affirmative, 94
the court then examined whether the exercise of jurisdiction over
Quattrone was reasonable or constitutional. 195 This depended on
an analysis of the nature of the effect caused in this state by
Quattrone's acts. 196 The court concluded that when the effect, i.e.,
the issuance of reserve shares, was of a special nature subjected
to regulation by the forum state or when, by his acts, the foreign
defendant had invoked the protection of the forum's laws, it was
189. 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478.
190. 63 Cal. App. 3d 548, 133 Cal. Rptr. 838.
191. 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548.
192. Id. at 299, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
193. Id. at 300, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
194. Id. at 303-04, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
195. Id. at 305, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
196. Id. at 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
reasonable to assert jurisdiction. The court found that California
had subjected the issuance of shares to special regulation and
that, by electing to participate in the program allowing the issu-
ance of the reserve shares, Quattrone had invoked the benefits of
California law. The court held that it was reasonable to assert
California jurisdiction over Quattrone.197
It is obvious that an analysis of the facts in terms of general-
limited jurisdiction would have been as unsatisfactory in Quat-
trone as in Titus. In fact, the acuity of the analysis in Quattrone
which probed the very nature of the effect caused in California,
demonstrates the blunderbuss quality of general-limited jurisdic-
tion as an analytical tool. Had the court been forced to analyze
the facts in terms of limited jurisdiction, general jurisdiction be-
ing typically inapplicable, it would have had to consider the issue
whether there was a nexus between Quattrone's activities in Cali-
fornia and the controversy. If the court found no such nexus,
there being no activities in California, it would never have ad-
vanced to the analysis of the effect of Quattrone's Pennsylvania
based activities.198
Although a more extended analysis of Quattrone is beyond the
scope of this paper, it should be noted that Quattrone was ap-
proved by the California Supreme Court in Sibley v. Superior
Court,199 a case decided a month after Cornelison. Sibley, where
the transactional events occurred outside California,2 00 disposed
of the case without a single reference to general or limited juris-
diction and with only two general, and passing, references to
Cornelison.201 The Sibley Court analyzed the problem, which
was conceptually the same as that in Cornelison, in terms of sec-
tion 37, and followed the "effects" analysis in Quattrone.202 If
Cornelison really announced the equivalent of a general theory of
state court jurisdiction, it is obscure why the supreme court re-
fused to refer to it a month after its birth. Of course, in all likeli-
hood the California Supreme Court had no such express
intention. Yet, it is undeniable that Cornelison has left the courts
of appeal and other inferior courts struggling with a most awk-
ward and substantially erroneous doctrine.
197. Id. at 306-07, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
198. The court's thorough analysis of the considerations which qualify as an ef-
fect under section 37 of the Restatement is probably the main contribution of the
Quattrone opinion to California law.
199. 16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 332, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976).
200. Id. at 444-45, 546 P.2d at 324, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
201. Id. at 445, 448, 546 P.2d at 324, 326, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36, 38. See note 3 supra.
202. 16 Cal. 3d at 445-46, 546 P.2d at 324-25, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
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CONCLUSION
If general jurisdiction is a concept which embraces or describes
all those situations where jurisdiction is asserted because of the
defendant's affiliation to the forum, it should ideally focus atten-
tion on the question of whether or not the particular relationship
with the forum (domicile, incorporation, doing business) reason-
ably supports the assertion of jurisdiction over all causes of ac-
tion against that defendant.20 3
However, if we are going to retain general jurisdiction as de-
fined in Cornelison, we should understand it to be nothing more
than a resurrection of Koninklijke L.M. v. Superior Court204 and
of Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.205 These deci-
sions, however, are neither modern nor useful. They analyze ju-
risdictional questions by determining whether the defendant is
present in the state instead of addressing the seminal question
whether the defendant's relationship to the forum warrants the
assertion of jurisdiction.
Despite Cornelison, the main focus in jurisdictional questions
must follow the requirement set down in Shaffer: jurisdiction
must be evaluated in terms of the relationship between the litiga-
tion, the forum and the defendant.
203. Credit for this theory must be, of course, unreservedly given to Professors
von Mehren and Trautman.
204. 107 Cal. App. 495, 237 P.2d 297 (1951).
205. 342 U.S. 437 (1962).

